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Two pieces of legislation form the cornerstones of modern immigration
reform. The first, the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"), was
enacted by Congress and signed into law by President Ronald Reagan in
1986.1 IRCA was proclaimed as a major step towards reform and was touted
as the solution to the problem of illegal migration.2 The second, the Immi-
gration Act of 1990 ("IMMACT 90"), 3 attracted far less attention, except
from those who closely follow immigration law. IMMACT 90 was seen as
the central reform of the legal migration system, specifically the portion of
the Act concerning those who may become permanent residents.
4
Two important components of IRCA were the employer sanction and
legalization provisions.' The employer sanction provisions imposed penalties
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'See Pub. L. No, 99-603, 100 Stat. 3359 (1986) (codified as amended in scattered sections
8 U.S.C.).
2 Statement on Signing the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986, 2 PuB. PAPERS
1522 (Nov. 6, 1986).
See Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 8 U.S.C.).
4 Statement on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1717 (Nov. 29,
1990). While the primary thrust of IMMACT 90 was the modification of the employment and
family-based immigration scheme, there were provisions in the law that, among other things,
made changes to nonimmigrant visas, expanded the definition of aggravated felonies, and in-
creased immigration enforcement. See IMMACT 90 §§ 201-31, 501-45, 104 Stat. 4978,
5012-28, 5048-67.
1 IRCA secs. 101, 201, 100 Stat. 3359, 3360-74, 3394-404. IRCA was a broad set of
amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006, Supp I.
2007, Supp. II 2008), which also included provisions intended to prevent immigration-related
employment discrimination as well as a verification system to prevent new immigrants from
accessing certain public benefits. Earlier that year, Congress had enacted the Anti-Drug Abuse
Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (codified as amended in scattered titles of
U.S.C.), which substantially expanded the crimes that could provide the basis for denying
status or admission to non-citizens. See IRCA § 1751, 100 Star. at 3207-047 to -048 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.). Later amendments, culminating in the major
revisions of 1996, further broadened the grounds for inadmissibility and deportability. See
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 ("IIRAIRA"), Pub. L.
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on employers who knowingly hired persons who were unauthorized to work
in the United States, with the expectation that the pressure would impact the
demand side of immigration.6 The legalization provisions established a
broad-based amnesty, which provided temporary legal status to many people
who had been in the United States illegally from a date no less than four
years prior to the statute's enactment. 7 IMMACT 90 restructured the legal
migration system by re-allocating visas for persons immigrating based on
family ties with U.S. citizens or permanent residents or whose skills were
needed by U.S. employers. In the years following the passage of the IRCA
and IMMACT 90, a large undocumented population8 once again confronts
the United States, leading to a call for comprehensive reform of the immi-
gration laws, including an amnesty.
This Article will focus primarily on the legalization or amnesty provi-
sions of current immigration reform efforts.9 This Article will not explore the
deficiencies of the legal immigration system or the reasons employers might
hire undocumented workers. Instead, it will focus on how legislation might
be crafted so as to maximize the immigration agency's ability to manage the
amnesty while dealing with the challenges of a large undocumented popula-
tion. In proposing a structure for amnesty, this discussion will touch on im-
migration laws enacted after IRCA, most notably legislation enacted in 1996
that makes current reform and amnesty much more complicated. ' 0 This Arti-
cle's purpose is not to present a justification for an immigration amnesty, for
No. 104-208, div. C, sec. 304, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-587 to -597 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1229-1229c (2006 & Supp. II 2008)); Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scat-
tered titles of U.S.C.); Omnibus Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, tit. VI,
§§ 7341-50, 102 Stat. 4181, 4469-73 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
6 H.R. REP. No. 99-682, pt. 1, at 45-46, 52, as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649,
5649-50, 5656.
7 IRCA, sec. 201, 100 Stat. at 3394-404 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (2006
& Supp. II 2008)). IRCA set the cutoff date for most persons who were seeking legalization at
January 1, 1982. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A)-(B). In addition to the cutoff date, the statute
also required that the person be able to meet other requirements such as being admissible as an
immigrant, not having been convicted of certain crimes, not having participated in the persecu-
tion of others, and having registered under the Military Selective Service Act. § 1255a(a)(4).
' Estimates of the number of undocumented persons are not easily ascertainable. One
source placed the number close to 11.8 million. See infra note 183.
9 This Article will use the terms "amnesty" and "legalization" interchangeably, as they
are synonymous. The term "legalization" was used in the formal IRCA legislation. Cases,
scholarly discussion, and the general public often refer to "amnesty."
0°See IIRAIRA div. C, sec. 304; AEDPA, 110 Stat. 1214. In enacting I1RAIRA and
AEDPA, Congress removed some of the ameliorative devices formerly available in the immi-
gration laws, added additional grounds of inadmissibility and deportability, and also imposed
more severe penalties on persons who remained in the United States without permission. This
resulted in many undocumented people being permanently barred from obtaining legal status.
See RICHARD A. BOSWELL, IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 4
(3d ed. 2000). One example of these punitive provisions is 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i)(I)-(Il)
(2006), which makes a person who has been "unlawfully" present in the United States for
more than six months or one year inadmissible for three and ten years respectively. A person
who has been unlawfully present for more than one year, leaves the United States, and returns
without permission is permanently barred from returning unless she can qualify for a waiver. 8
[Vol. 47
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it appears that some type of amnesty will be a component of whatever com-
prehensive immigration reform is enacted." More than anything else, a criti-
cal part of the debate will revolve around the terms of the amnesty, such as
what cutoff date might be appropriate, whether applicants will be required to
leave the country first, the type of documentation they will be required to
possess in order to qualify, how absences will be treated, or what acts might
disqualify them from eligibility.
In presenting its proposal, this Article first sets forth several guiding
principles that underlie amnesty programs. It then draws on two types of
immigration relief, which are forms of amnesty in all but name and with
which the immigration agency and courts have had much experience: "regis-
try" and "suspension of deportation."' 2
II. PRINCIPLES FOR AMNESTY
Four overarching principles provide the foundation for the proposed
legislation set forth in this Article. First, the program should be rooted in
preserving family unity, meeting the needs for work skills, and fostering our
humanitarian values, all of which have long been at the core of U.S. immi-
gration policy. 3 Second, the program should have as part of its purpose the
U.S.C. § l182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I) (2006); SARAH IGNATIUS & ELISABETH S. STICKNEY, IMMIGRA-
TION LAW AND THE FAMILY §§ 12.73-74 (2009).
" See Bryn Siegel, The Political Discourse of Amnesty in Immigration Policy, 41 AKRON
L. REV. 291, 307-09 (2008). While amnesty has been one of the most contentious issues in the
political debate, it has been part of major legislation introduced. See, e.g., H.R. 5161, 108th
Cong. (2004); H.R. 5040, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 10, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2845, 108th
Cong. (2004); H.R. 5024, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2774, 108th Cong. (2004). In the process of
negotiating the political process, legislators have used other terms to describe what might
otherwise be characterized as "amnesty." For example, in 2005, Senators Edward Kennedy
(D-Mass.) and John McCain (R-Ariz.) introduced something that they called "earned adjust-
ment." See S. 1033, 109th Cong. (2005).
2 Suspension of deportation was renamed as "cancellation of removal" to conform with
immigration legislation enacted in 1996 that eliminated the two separate procedures of exclu-
sion and deportation and melded them into a unitary "removal" proceeding. See IIRAIRA,
Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, sec. 304, 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-587 to -597 (1996) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1229-1229c (2006 & Supp. 112008)). Prior to HRAIRA, a person was
placed in exclusion proceedings if she was found at the border seeking admission. The person
would be placed in deportation hearings if she had managed to gain entry into the United
States. See In the Matter of the Application of Imane Phelisna for a Writ of Habeas Corpus,
551 F. Supp. 960 (E.D.N.Y. 1982). A person arriving at the border who was allowed to physi-
cally enter under a grant of "parole" would be treated as continuing to seek admission and
would face an exclusion hearing.
"3 See, e.g., Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, § 19, 39 Stat. 874, 889-90 (repealed 1952)
(humanitarian relief of suspension of deportation is provided if "serious economic detriment"
would result to the person's U.S. citizen or legal resident alien spouse, parent or minor child);
Statement on Signing the Immigration Act of 1990, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1717 (Nov. 29, 1990)
(President George H. W. Bush recognized that IMMACT 90 "accomplishes what [his] Ad-
ministration sought from the outset of the immigration reform process: a complementary
blending of our tradition of family reunification with increased immigration of skilled individ-
uals to meet our economic needs"). While there are multiple principles underpinning U.S.
immigration policy, family unification is central. H.R. REP. No. 101-723 (1990), as reprinted
in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6710, 6711; H.R. REP. No. 89-745, at 1, 12 (1965). Another goal has
2010]
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amelioration of unnecessary hardship to the individual seeking amnesty as
well as to the community of which the person has become a part. Third, the
statutory scheme should be as uncomplicated as possible to minimize the
risk of adjudicators and potential beneficiaries adopting multiple or conflict-
ing interpretations. Finally, the government agency charged with implement-
ing the program should be able to administer it relatively easily and the
potential beneficiaries of the program should be able to easily understand its
provisions.
Three important forces play a key role in driving migration. Family
unification has always been a strong force behind migration. 4 Surely, an-
other reason for much of the migration is a search for work and opportu-
nity-indeed, many migrants come at the behest of employers seeking their
work, and in more recent times, employment has become a significant part
of migration. 5 The other historical element of immigration has been humani-
tarian; many migrants have come to the United States to avoid some form of
persecution. 6 To this day, these three elements of immigration policy serve
the important function of fostering a more stable immigrant population. Cer-
tainly, an immigrant who is welcomed by family and loved ones, or who
comes for employment and remains united with family, will be more easily
integrated into the community. 7 Providing refuge from persecution also
been to balance needs for labor with protection of the domestic workforce. CHARLES GORDON
ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 20.03[1] (2009). Finally, the humanitarian crisis
witnessed in persecutions perpetrated in Hitler's Germany culminated in the codification of
international refugee norms with the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-
212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); GUILLERMINA JASSO
& MARK ROSENZWEIG, THE NEW CHOSEN PEOPLE: IMMIGRANTS IN THE UNITED STATES
338-40 (1990).
14 U.S. immigration law, like the laws of many countries, includes provisions for family
and employment-based immigration. These are found in the elaborate immigrant quota system,
first enacted in 1921 and incorporated into the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and
later amendments. See 8 U.S.C. § l153(a)-(b) (2006). In many situations, the immigration
laws provide for the admission of non-immigrants with their immediate family members. See
RICHARD A. BOSWELL, ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW 98 (2d ed. 2009) [hereinafter Es-
SENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW].
"5 Between 1999 and 2008, the total percentage of immigrants who came to the United
States under employment-based preferences increased from 8.8% to 15%. See OFFICE OF IMMI-
GRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2008 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STA-
TISTICs 18-19 tbl.6 (2009) [hereinafter 2008 IMMIGRATION STATISTICS]. In the last ten years,
employment-based admission peaked in 2005, at 22%. See id.
6 Between 1999 and 2008, the total percentage of refugees and asylees who were admit-
ted to the United States increased from 6.6% to 15%. See id. In the last ten years, refugee and
asylee admission was at its peak in 2006, at 17%. See id.
7 See U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM'N, REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSION: AB-
STRACTS OF REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 61-747 (3d Sess. 1910).
The Dillingham Commission found that compared to immigrants who were single, or whose
wives and families remained in their native countries, "the process of assimilation [for fami-
lies] is usually much more rapid [as they] as a rule live in much more wholesome surround-
ings, and are reached by more of the agencies which promote assimilation." Id. at 42. The
report also found that "[t]he most potent influence in promoting the assimilation of the family
is the children, who, through contact with American life in the schools, almost invariably act
as the unconscious agents in the uplift of their parents" and continue the "Americanizing
2010] Crafting an Amnesty with Traditional Tools
serves to meld our values with those in the world community with whom we
share international humanitarian norms.'
8
There are two fundamentally different paths that can be taken in fash-
ioning an amnesty or legalization program. One approach would craft a pro-
gram that is broad in its reach with relatively few requirements. A different
approach would create a program crafted to narrow the scope of eligibility
for amnesty, which is more punitive than beneficent. To that end, the pro-
gram could be made to limit the potential beneficiaries and even to have a
long set of requirements for each applicant to meet in order to qualify. This
more restrictive approach would result in fewer individuals qualifying. It
would also attract fewer applicants, undermining the underlying purpose of a
comprehensive legalization program. Another relevant consideration in fash-
ioning an amnesty provision is how the requirements are to be interpreted-
will interpretations err on the side of inclusion or exclusion? How potential
beneficiaries will view an amnesty program's terms is a critical part of the
choice regarding the type of amnesty program that should be enacted.
influence" when they become wage earners. Id. A study of Chinese immigrant families found
that:
The presence of support from people of the same country of origin and members of
the host culture were [sic] likely to facilitate an immigrant's adaptation ... [as
c]ontact with people from the same country reinforced one's sense of self and one's
affinity to the heritage culture, whereas contact with people from the host culture
facilitated the entry into American society.
Xiaolin Xie et al., Strengths and Challenges in Chinese Immigrant Families, 14 GREAT PLAINS
NAT. RESOURCES J. 203, 216 (2004). Further, in a study of a Vietnamese enclave, research
"found that although Vietnamese young people lived in a socially marginal local environment
they were shielded from the negative influences of that environment by being tightly bound up
in a system of ethnic social relations providing both control and direction," thus leading to a
limited involvement in crime. Min Zhou & Carl Bankston, Delinquency and Acculturation in
the Twenty-first Century: A Decade's Change in a Vietnamese American Community, in IMMI-
GRATION AND CRIME: ETHN1cITY, RACE, AND VIOLENCE 117, 119-120 (Ramino Martinez, Jr. &
Abel Valenzuela, Jr. eds., 2006).
" Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223. Modem
refugee protections were only codified into U.S. law in 1980 in the form of the Refugee Act of
1980. See Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. In the period between the end of World War II and
the enactment of the Refugee Act of 1980, the legislative responses were focused on the partic-
ular crisis of the day. See, e.g., Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat.
1009; Amendment to the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 81-555, 64 Stat. 219;
Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 67 Stat. 400; Immigration and Nationality
Act Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-239, 79 Stat. 911. One of the purposes in enacting
the Refugee Act was to bring U.S. law into harmony with international humanitarian norms.
See S. Rep. No. 590, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. 19 (1980). For an excellent exploration of the efforts
which led up to the enactment of the Refugee Act, see Deborah E. Anker & Michael H.
Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIGO
L. REV. 9 (1981). In addition to protecting persons from individualized persecution, the immi-
gration laws include protections for persons facing civil war, political upheaval, civil unrest,
and natural disaster. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a (2006).
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11I. REGISTRY, SUSPENSION, AND CANCELLATION OF REMOVAL
For nearly a century, the immigration laws of the United States have
used two primary mechanisms to provide immigration status to people who
were either in an undocumented status or who had no clear record of having
been lawfully admitted to the United States. 19 The first mechanism-regis-
try-provides blanket lawful permanent residency to non-citizens without
status who can prove that they have been in the country since before an
established statutory cutoff date. The second-suspension of deportation or
cancellation of removal-provides the beneficiary with a grant of lawful
permanent resident status as of the date that the relief is granted if the appli-
cant can meet the hardship and physical presence requirements.20 While
these two forms of relief are not the only methods for conferring permanent
residency, 2' they both eliminate grounds for possible deportation and are the
closest existing legal parallels to what is commonly regarded as an amnesty.
Both methods avoid forcing a person to leave the country and await a possi-
ble future return with some legal status. In addition, both forms of relief
contain an implicit recognition of the hardships that would be visited on the
family and community if a person were forced to depart.
A. Historical Origins of Registry
In 1917, the United States enacted its first comprehensive immigration
legislation in response to the large-scale migration that began in the latter
part of the nineteenth century and flowed into the early part of the twentieth
century. 2 The major impetus behind the Immigration Act of 1917 was to
place controls on the admission of persons coming to the United States. 23
19 The term "status" is merely used here to describe the legal position of the person in the
United States. The term "undocumented" is a more modem expression ascribed to persons
who may be in the country illegally, in the process of seeking status, or simply lacking any
legally cognizable status under the immigration laws. For purposes of this discussion, the term
is meant to encompass all persons who may be found in the United States, whether inadmissi-
ble or deportable, who are not either lawful permanent residents or legally in their nonimmi-
grant status.
"See GORDON ET AL., supra note 13, §§ 74.06-07.
21 Some persons regularize or gain legal status by applying for adjustment of status, or, if
they have the requisite skills or family ties, by obtaining immigrant visas or seeking adjust-
ment of their status. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254a. In other situations, such as where someone would
otherwise be ineligible for admission or subject to deportation because of a ground of inadmis-
sibility or deportability, the statute provides for "waivers" of those grounds. See ESSENTIALS
OF IMMIGRATION LAW, supra note 14, at 44-48. At the other extreme, others may obtain their
permanent residencies through private bills introduced by members of Congress. See ANNA
MARIE GALLAGHER, PRIVATE BILLS AND PARDONS IN IMMIGRATION 7 (2008).
22 Immigration Act of 1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952); EDWARD P. HUTCHIN-
SON, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF AMERICAN IMMIGRATION POLICY 420 (1981).
23 The Dillingham Commission, commissioned by Congress to study the impact of immi-
gration in U.S. society, released a forty-two volume study, which concluded that immigration
posed a threat to society. See U.S. IMMIGRATION COMM'N, REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION COM-
MISSION: ABSTRACTS OF REPORTS OF THE IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, S. Doc. No. 61-747, at
[Vol. 47
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Political pressure had been building since the late 1800s and immigration
had reached its historic peak, in both absolute and proportional terms.2 4 The
racial component of the anti-immigrant backlash, which arose due to the
ethnicities and nationalities of many of these immigrants, was also evident.
25
Adding to the previously erected racial barriers to the admission of Chinese
immigrants in 1882, Congress began setting "qualitative" restrictions such
that more and more immigrants began to fall into "undesirable" categories,
including the poor, those with health problems, the less educated, and people
with various criminal records.16 During World War I, the opposition to immi-
gration became particularly strong, culminating in the passage of the Immi-
gration Act of 1917 over President Woodrow Wilson's veto.2 7 A review of
the report by what became known as the Dillingham Commission, a commit-
tee comprised of House and Senate members that studied immigration to the
United States, reveals a strong concern about changes in the country's racial
composition. The Commission concluded that the demographic changes that
48 (3d Sess. 1910) ("The Commission as a whole recommend[ed] restriction as demanded by
[the] economic, moral, and social considerations, fumish[ed] in its report [and] point[ed]
out methods by which Congress can attain the desired result if its judgment coincides with that
of the Commission," proposing a "reading and writing test as the most feasible single method
of restricting undesirable immigration.").
24 Available statistics indicate that approximately 14.5 million people immigrated to the
United States between 1900 and 1920. See S. REP. No. 81-1515, at 815 (1950). A review of
immigration statistics reveals that nearly 17 million immigrated during a comparable period
between 1980 and 2000 with the overall national population in 2000 at approximately 281
million. See IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2000 STATISTI-
CAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 18 tbl. 1 (2002). The
population of the United States was 106 million in 1920. See POPULATION ESTIMATES PRO-
GRAM, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HISTORICAL NATIONAL POPULATION ESTIMATES: JULY 1, 1900
TO JULY 1, 1999 (2000), available at http://www.census.gov/popest/archives/1990s/popclock-
est.txt.
25 Beginning in the late 1800s, the migration patterns had shifted from northern European
to southern and eastern European and from Protestant to Catholic. See S. REP. No. 81-1515, at
235; S. Doc. No. 61-747, at 23. At the same time, Jews began arriving in larger numbers. See
S. REP. No. 81-1515, at 235. By the 1880s, migration from Asia had been all but cut off by the
Chinese Exclusion Act and other efforts. Act of May 6, 1882, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58, amended by
Act of July 5, 1884, ch. 220, 23 Stat. 115 (repealed 1943). This amending provision prohibited
the admission of Asians to the United States, and the Supreme Court upheld these laws in the
"Chinese Exclusion Case," Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 606-09 (1889). Japanese
migration was closed off through the so-called "Gentleman's Agreement" between Japan and
the United States in 1907. See H.R. REP. No. 82-1365 (1952), as reprinted in 1952
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1313, 1664. In 1917, Congress barred immigration from the Asia-Pacific Trian-
gle altogether. Immigration Act of 1917, 39 Stat. 874.
26 Immigration Act of Feb. 20, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, 34 Stat. 898. The Act of 1907,
among other things, increased the head tax on those coming to the country to four dollars and
added provisions relating to those with physical and medical conditions affecting their ability
to earn a living and to unaccompanied children.
27 See 54 CONG. REc. 2626, 2629 (1917). A Joint Commission on Immigration, created in
1907, resulted in the dissemination of a report in 1911, culminating in the passage of the
Immigration Act of 1917. Immigration Act of February 20, 1907, Pub. L. No. 59-96, § 39, 34
Stat. 898, 909; S. Doc. No. 61-747.
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had been taking place in the United States needed to be changed
dramatically. 8
In this climate, numerous new limitations were put into place, leading
to the establishment of the first quota restrictions in 1921.9 These quota
restrictions were designed to control the admission of new immigrants in
order to change the racial composition of the United States. Immigrants
without legal status who had established ties within the community were
caught within these restrictions. The legal mechanism adopted to deal with
this group of people-registry-converted the person's last established ad-
mission date into a "record of lawful admission," thereby making him eligi-
ble for naturalization. 30
Registry has been a part of the immigration laws since 1929, 31 and the
qualifying cutoff date for the benefit has been amended numerous times. The
first registry date was set at June 3, 192132 and was later moved to July 1,
1924,13 June 28, 1940,14 June 30, 1948,31 and most recently to January 1,
1972.36 While proponents of advancing the registry date were not able to
expand the reach of the benefit, a number of modifications were enacted
over the years. Establishing a record of admission date enabled the recipient
to seek naturalization because the admission was effectively backdated. 37
The clear intent of the first registry was to create a record of lawful admis-
sion for anyone who had entered the country prior to the June 3, 1921 date, 38
thereby granting a type of amnesty, permanent residency, and an opportunity
21 See S. Doc. No. 61-747, at 45. Many of the concerns presented in the Dillingham report
also appear in the 1950 report that served as the foundation for the McCarran-Walter Act of
1952. See S. REP. No. 81-1515, at 805; see also A.J. McLaughlin, Immigration and the Public
Health, 29 PUB. HEALTH PAPERS & REP. 224, 224 (1903) ("With the change in the racial
character of immigration, most marked in the past decade, a pronounced deterioration in the
general physique of the immigrants, and a much higher percentage of loathsome and danger-
ous diseases is noticeable.").
29 Act of May 19, 1921, ch. 8, 42 Stat. 5. While the quotas set in 1921 were "temporary,"
they were made permanent in 1924. See Immigration Act of 1924, ch. 190, 43 Stat. 153 (re-
pealed 1952).
30 HUTCHINSON, supra note 22, at 563.
"' Registry Act of 1929, ch. 536, § l(a)(1), 45 Stat. 1512, 1513 (repealed 1940).
32 Id.
3 Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 517, 53 Stat. 1243 (amending the Registry Act of 1929
§ l(a)(1)). The McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 did not change the registry date. See Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, § 249, 66 Stat. 163, 219 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1259 (2006)). The "McCarran-Walter Act of 1952" is the common name for the
comprehensive immigration amendments enacted in the Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, which form the foundation for modem immigration law. See id.
4 Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-616, 72 Stat. 546 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1259).
" Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 19, 79 Stat. 911,920 (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. § 1259).
36 IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, § 203(a)-(b), 100 Stat. 3359, 3405 (1986) (codified at 8
U.S.C. § 1259).
" See Registry Act of 1929, ch. 536, § 3, 45 Stat. 1512, 1513 (repealed 1940). This is one
of the reasons why a person who seeks registry must not be ineligible for citizenship, since the
original purpose of registry was to allow the person to proceed to naturalization.
3 See id. ch. 536, § l(a)(l), 45 Stat. at 1513.
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to apply for citizenship.39 One impetus for creating registry was that, with
the 1906 enactment of stricter rules requiring the registration of all persons
coming to the United States, there were many people with sympathetic cases
who did not have documents evidencing their records of admission.4° With
the increased enforcement of deportation statutes, some legal mechanism
was necessary to regularize the statuses of these people and allow them to
apply for citizenship.4' A powerful justification for this procedure was that
these people were already interwoven into the community, as many of them
had created families in the United States. Registry provided a fairly broad
and comprehensive vehicle for granting legal status to its beneficiaries. The
creation of this immigration relief was, in effect, the creation of a "record of
[lawful] admission," which otherwise had not previously existed. Another
way to view registry was that it created a form of a statute of limitations on
removal for a narrowly defined group.
42
There were relatively few requirements to qualify for the earlier regis-
try: proof of physical entry before the cutoff date, good moral character, and
not being subject to deportation or ineligible for U.S. citizenship. 43 Later
amendments to the registry requirements replaced the deportability provision
with one that proscribed registry for persons who were inadmissible based
on more serious exclusion grounds.44
Precise information regarding the number of persons who applied for
and received registry is unavailable for the period between 1932 and 1945.
However, records do show that a number of undocumented persons were
able to take advantage of the program in its first years. According to the
9 This differed from amnesty in 1986, which granted temporary status and only allowed a
person to apply for citizenship five years after she was granted permanent residency. A person
granted amnesty would first receive temporary residence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a) (2006).
They would be eligible to apply for permanent residence nineteen months after having been
granted temporary residence. See 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(b)(1)(A). A person would be eligible to
apply for naturalization after they had been been a lawful permanent resident for at least five
years. See 8 U.S.C. § 1427 (2006).
0 Act of June 29, 1906, ch. 3592, § 1, 34 Stat. 596, 596 (repealed 1940). The 1906 Act
established the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization and required the Commissioner to
"cause a registry to be made in the case of each alien arriving in the United States." Id. The
Act further provided that the person be granted a certificate of registry. Id. The registry estab-
lished in the 1929 legislation effectively created a record of registry where there previously was
none. See Registry Act of 1929, 45 Stat. 1512.
"' At the time, it was understood that people who had been in the country for a continuous
period of eight years should be eligible to apply for citizenship. HtJTCHiNSON, supra note 22, at
563.
42 Few provisions of the immigration laws contain statutes of limitations. As long as a
person is a non-citizen, she is subject to the immigration provisions relating to grounds of
inadmissibility and deportability. A person who becomes naturalized remains subject to denat-
uralization if she was originally ineligible for naturalization. Act of March 2, 1929, Pub. L.
No. 70-962, ch. 536, 45 Stat. 1512.
4" Id. The reference to "ineligibility for U.S. citizenship" was meant to prohibit Asians
from being granted registry, as they remained ineligible for citizenship until the 1940s.
" See Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-616, 72 Stat. 546 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1259 (2006)). The statute used the language "criminals, procurers and other immoral
persons, subversives, violators of the narcotic laws or smugglers of aliens." Id.
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Commissioner General of Immigration, during the first year of registry,
18,800 applications were filed, and by the end of the year, nearly half of
those were adjudicated, with 8098 approved and 1125 denied.45 The Com-
missioner's 1931 report revealed that the number of certificates of registry
issued increased substantially that year.46 An analysis of the numbers in 1931
show that more than 60% of applicants entered the country between 1911
and 1921, approximately 25% between 1901 and 1910, and 12% prior to
1901. 47 The number of applications for registry dropped to 14,414 in 1932.48
The Commissioner General of Immigration expressed concern that the high
filing fee and the unemployment rate at the time caused this decrease in
applications. 49 While detailed information is not available disaggregated by
year between 1929 and 1945, it appears that during this period more than
200,000 persons were granted registry, with the number of applicants re-
maining at approximately 10,000 per year through 1939.50 The number of
applicants increased substantially with the advancement of the date in 1939,
reaching its peak in 1943, and then dropping from 1944 to 1946. 51 Even with
the enactment of the amendments to the registry date in 1958, the number of
persons granted registry did not increase substantially.52 Indeed, the agency
estimated that the total number of beneficiaries would be between 10,000
and 15,000 persons. 53 In reality, until the registry date was advanced to 1948,
the number of applications diminished steadily to a low of 2326 in 1965.1
4
41 See BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SIONER GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 27 (1930).46 See BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMIS-
SIONER GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION TO THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 46 (1931). The number of
certificates of registry issued nearly doubled in 1931 from the previous year's 8098 to 16,242.
ld.
47 The report provides the breakdown as follows: prior to 1901, 1985; 1901 to 1910, 4096;
and 1911 to 1921, 10,161. Id.
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IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'r OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 24 (1946).
51 Id.
52 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 1959 4. While the amendment was not en-
acted until August 1958, the report for the fiscal year reveals that 4321 persons were granted
registry, of which only 1309 had entered between July 1, 1924 and June 28, 1940, the new cut
off date. Id.
" Id. Even in the fiscal years that followed the advancement of the registry date to June
28, 1940, most of the persons granted the benefit had entered the country prior to July 1, 1924.
See IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 1961 5 ("more than three fourths ... entered the
United States prior..."); IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 1960 4 ("two thirds of
the cases . . . had entered . . . prior").
' See IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT
OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 1965 5 [hereinafter 1965 IMMIGRATION
REPORT] (2326 persons granted registry); IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T
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Even with the 1965 advancement of the registry date to June 30, 1948, the
number of registry beneficiaries never exceeded 2887 per year, the peak
reached in fiscal year 1966.11 The numbers remained well below 1000 bene-
ficiaries per year until the registry was advanced to January 1, 1972 in
1986.56
The current version of registry, formulated when Congress established
the Amnesty of 1986, set the registry date at January 1, 1972.11 In order to
qualify, an applicant must have been in the United States unlawfully any
time since before the cutoff date (January 1, 1972), be of good moral charac-
ter, not be ineligible for U.S. citizenship, and not be deportable as a terrorist
or a Nazi. 8 The same inadmissibility grounds under previous registry would
also preclude a granting of relief.5 9 A registry applicant may apply for the
benefit whether or not she is in removal proceedings, meaning that she may
affirmatively present herself before the agency and seek the benefit, or, if
she is facing proceedings, she may make the application as a defense to her
OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 1964 5
(2916, reflecting a 7% reduction from the previous year); IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION
SERVICE 1963 6 (3133 applicants, reflecting a reduction of 13% from the previous year).
" IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'r OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 1967 8.
56 The agency report for 1984 noted that the registry cases from 1979 to 1984 never ex-
ceeded 262 cases and diminished during that period, with 111 persons receiving registry in
1984. See IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1984 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 14. According to the 1987
Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the number of persons
granted registry was 8153, which represented a dramatic increase from prior years. IMMIGRA-
TION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1987 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE
IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 11 (1988). However, this number is still ex-
tremely small given the 790,000 applicants under the legalization program in that same period.
Id. at 44.
57 See IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sec. 203(a)-(b), 100 Stat. 3359, 3405 (1986) (codified at
8 U.S.C. § 1259 (2006)).
58 8 U.S.C. § 1259 provides that:
A record of lawful admission for permanent residence may, in the discretion of the
Attorney General and under such regulations as he may prescribe, be made in the
case of any alien, as of the date of the approval of his application or, if entry oc-
curred prior to July 1, 1924, as of the date of such entry, if no such record is other-
wise available and such alien shall satisfy the Attorney General that he is not
inadmissible under section section 1182(a)(3)(E) of this title or under section
1182(a) of this title insofar as it relates to criminals, procurers and other immoral
persons, subversives, violators of the narcotic laws or smugglers of aliens, and he
establishes that he-
(a) entered the United States prior to January 1, 1972;
(b) has had his residence in the United States continuously since such entry;
(c) is a person of good moral character; and
(d) is not ineligible to citizenship and is not deportable under section
1227(a)(4)(B) of this title.
§ 1259. Literally what occurs is that the person's established entry date is converted to a record
of lawful admission thereby enabling the person to remain in the country and should she
desire, apply for naturalization.
59 Id.
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removal.6 The applicant is required to show that she has maintained continu-
ous "residence" in the United States since January 1, 1972.61 Arguably, a
person who qualifies for registry and is returning from a short trip abroad
should also be able to seek registry in the event that she is placed in proceed-
ings upon return. 62 In addition, the applicant is required to show that she is
not ineligible on account of certain criminal grounds, including prostitution,
subversive activities, narcotics, or alien smuggling. 63 For a person who has
been granted registry, the grounds of inadmissibility, which would normally
be applicable to her, may be waived, since at the conclusion of the process
she is granted lawful permanent residency as of the date her application is
approved. 64 This differs from the status accorded to beneficiaries of the 1986
amnesty who initially only received temporary residency and then could ap-
ply for permanent residency two years later.
65
One of the requirements under registry is that the person be able to
show that they have been "continuously" resident in the United States
throughout the statutory period.66 By the terms of the statute, the relief is
only available to persons who are not in a legal status or who were not
admitted as such.67 Continuous residence allows for breaks in a person's
physical presence in the country. 68 The determination of what constitutes
"residence" involves consideration of the person's regular place of general
abode without regard to intent.6 9 This means that a person who has had her
physical home in the United States since January 1, 1972 and could show
- 8 C.F.R. § 1249.2(a) (2008).
61 8 U.S.C. § 1259.
62 Existing regulations provide that registry is available in removal proceedings "other
than [for] an arriving" person. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 249.2(a), 1249.2(a) (emphasis supplied). All
other applicants must seek registry benefits before the district director. Id. The regulations may
be a misapplication of the law because they fail to consider the amendments enacted in 1996,
which redefined when a person is seeking admission to include persons who were not lawfully
admitted. IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, sec. 301(a), 110 Stat. 3009, 3009-575 (1996)
(codified at 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(13)(A) (2006)).63 See 8 U.S.C. § 1259.
64 See 8 C.F.R. §§ 249.1, 1249.1. The term "inadmissibility" is used since a person who is
illegally in the United States remains inadmissible following the enactment of IIRAIRA. 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(A). Prior to IIRAIRA, a person who illegally entered the country was
subject to grounds of deportability. See 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1)(B) (1994).
65 See supra note 39. In addition, each amnesty applicant had to individually qualify. This
means that a spouse could not accord temporary residence or amnesty to her spouse and chil-
dren. This is unlike most forms of traditional immigrant benefits where the derivative status is
extended to the immediate family members. See EsSENrnALS OF IMMIGRAION LAW, supra note
14, at 135-36.
68 U.S.C. § 1259(b).
67 8 U.S.C. § 1259. For example, a person who was admitted as a permanent resident, or
who initially had entered illegally and then later became a permanent resident, could not use
the relief as a way of avoiding removal. See Angulo-Dominguez v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 1147,
1151 (9th Cir. 2002); In re M-P-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 747, 749 (B.I.A. 1962).
68See 8 U.S.C. §§ I 101(a)(33), 1259(b) (2006); In re Jalil, 19 I. & N. Dec. 679 (B.I.A.
1988). But see Manzo-Fontes v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 53 F.3d 280, 283 (9th
Cir. 1995) (thirteen-month stay in Mexico rendered applicant's residency "discontinuous").69 See 8 U.S.C. § I 101(a)(33).
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that she has continued to live in the United States throughout this time, de-
spite absences, would still be able to meet the requirements of the statute.
Because only those who are able to show both entry and continuous
residence since January 1, 1972 are eligible for the current version of regis-
try, it is rarely a viable remedy.70 In order to qualify for registry, a person
would have to have lived in the United States without authorization for
nearly four decades. Such a person would likely be able to avail himself of
other immigration remedies." With a fixed, rather than rolling, cutoff date,
the pool of eligible persons will not likely grow. The legislative history on
the advancement of the registry date to 1972 is silent as to why that, and not
another date closer to 1986, was selected. 72 Obviously, any date used for
registry is the product of compromise. When enacted, the 1986 amnesty was
already viewed by its critics as a significant compromise and a reward for
illegal immigration. 73 The decision to use the 1972 cutoff rather than a more
recent registry date reflected the more restrictive of the possible choices or
perhaps that temporary status was more politically acceptable than a perma-
nent status such as registry.
While the first registry was enacted following a period of large-scale
migration and after strict controls had been put into place, the 1986 amnesty
was established during increased immigration and coupled with strong en-
forcement provisions.74 During the depression years, immigration dropped
significantly, and many of those who had come earlier in the century began
to return to their native countries.7" It was not until the early 1970s that the
70 See supra note 58 and accompanying text. In 1990, the number of registry beneficiaries
was 4633 and, in 1997, the number had fallen to 195. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION
SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1997 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATU-
RALIZATION SERVICE 32 (1999).
71 For example, if a person can establish the requisite level of hardship, she may apply to
obtain cancellation of removal. See discussion infra note 103 and accompanying text. If she
has a qualifying family relationship with a U.S. citizen or permanent resident, she might seek
an immigrant visa or adjustment of status. See ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW, supra note
14, at 133-34. If the person has an occupation or skills that are in short supply, she might be
able to obtain permanent residency based on a U.S. employer's need for those skills. Id. at
141-51.
72 Rep. Bill McCollum (R-Fla.) introduced a proposal that would have advanced the regis-
try date to 1976, but it never received sufficient support. See 132 CONG. REC. 29,990 (1986).
13 Indeed, one senator indicated his opposition to the 1986 legislation during the congres-
sional debates by saying that he "must oppose the principle that, in legalizing those who have
entered the country illegally, we will be rewarding lawbreakers. [IRCA is] a slap in the face to
legal aliens who now reside here, it is a slap to those who continue to wait, [and] it sets an
untenable and undesirable principle for dealing with future lawbreakers. We should not reward
those who have successfully violated U.S. immigration policy, those who can prove they have
broken U.S. law." 132 CONG. REC. 33,235 (1986) (statement of Sen. Hubert Humphrey (D-
Minn.)).
" Immigration levels reached a peak in the early 1900s, but fell significantly after the
immigration legislation of 1917. See, e.g., 2008 IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, supra note 15, at
18-19 tbl.1 (showing that the number of persons granted permanent resident status fell from
295,403 in 1917 to 110,618 in 1918).
" See Deportation of Criminals, Preservation of Family Units, Permit Noncriminal Aliens
to Legalize Their Status: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the Subcomm. on Immigration of the H.
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number of foreigners coming to the United States began to increase beyond
the level of the quota restrictions, and it was only in the 1980s and 1990s
that the level of immigration reached rates comparable to those of the early
1900s. 76 Therefore, using a January 1972 cutoff date for registry guaranteed
that only a relatively small group would qualify, as the significant increase
in immigration did not occur until after that date.
In examining registry, it is useful to track how it was used before and
after the passage of the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952.77 The first registry,
enacted in 1929, set a cutoff date in 1921, a date that preceded the Act by
eight years.7 1 The 1939 amendment set the registry date at 1924, an advance
of only three years over a period of twenty-three. 79 Congress did not advance
the registry date when it enacted the most comprehensive immigration re-
form in history in 1952.80 It was not until the 1958 amendments that Con-
gress advanced the registry date by sixteen years to 1940.81 The next
advancement occurred in 1965, moving the date by eight years to 1948.82
Finally, the most recent advancement occurred in 1986, when the date was
moved ahead twenty-four years to 1972.83 While the first registry date was
set much closer to its enactment, later amendments did not follow this ame-
liorative objective. Each successive registry advancement appears to have
been established to deal with the undocumented population of the time and
resulted from a realization that the creation of relief was favorable to other
alternatives.M4
Comm. on the Judiciary, 74th Cong. 13-14 (1936) (statement of Colonel D. W. MacCormack,
U.S. Comm'r of Immigration & Naturalization, Department of Labor) (noting that in the pre-
ceding five years, 289,000 more people had left the United States than had entered).
7 6 See BILL ONG HING, DEFINING AMERICA THROUGH IMMIGRATION POLICY 98 (2004).
These backlogs in immigrant visas have persisted to the present in many of the family prefer-
ence categories. A review of the Visa Bulletin issued monthly by the Department of State from
1995 to the present can be found at Visa Bulletin, http://travel.state.gov/visa/frvi/bulletin/bulle-
tin 1770.html (last visited Nov. 1, 2009). The numbers of persons who were granted perma-
nent residency in 1907 and 1914 exceeded 1.2 million, and that number was only reached
again in 1990 when it reached 1.5 million. See 2008 Immigration Statistics, supra note 15, at
18-19 tbl.l.
7 The "McCarran-Walter Act of 1952" is the common name for the comprehensive im-
migration amendments enacted in 1952, which form the foundation for modem immigration
law. See ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered titles of U.S.C.).
7' Registry Act of 1929, ch. 536, § l(a)(1), 45 Stat. 1512, 1513 (repealed 1940).
79 Act of Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 517, 53 Stat. 1243 (amending the Registry Act of 1929
§ l(a)(])).
"0 See McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 § 249, 66 Stat. at 219 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1259 (2006)).
8 Act of Aug. 8, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-616, 72 Stat. 546 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1259).
82 Act of Oct. 3, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, § 19, 79 Stat. 911,920 (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. § 1259).
83 IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sec. 203(a)-(b), 100 Stat. 3359, 3405 (codified at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1259).
" It is noteworthy that soon after the enactment of the first registry in 1929, the Commis-
sioner General was concerned that many who were otherwise qualified would not apply be-
cause of the high filing fee:
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Over the years since registry was first enacted, there have been attempts
either to expand its reach or to advance the cutoff date. For example, in
1933, legislation that had been passed by the House of Representatives and
reported to the Senate would have advanced the registry date to July 1,
1924.85 The proposal failed, however, because the congressional session en-
ded before the two bills could be reconciled and put to a vote.86 In 1934,
various registry bills were introduced in both houses of Congress, the most
generous of which would have removed the registry date and replaced it
with a ten-year continuous residency requirement.87 While efforts at reform
of the registry provisions continued through several congressional sessions,
no agreement was reached on these immigration proposals.8 In 1962, an
effort was made to enact a change that, among other things, would have
moved the registry date to December 24, 1952.89 But after a series of amend-
ments, Congress amended the suspension of deportation statute instead of
changing the registry date.90 During the 1970s, there were renewed discus-
sions of possible advancement of the registry date, 9' but none of these mate-
rialized into positive legislation until enactment of the IRCA in 1986.
The applications for registry have shown continuing decreases, there having been
18,800 two years ago. This does not mean that the field is being exhausted, but is a
reflection of the distressing unemployment situation, as the application fee of $20
looms large in these times, and so can not be spared even for this desirable purpose.
1932 IMMIGRATION REPORT, supra note 48, at 36.
" H.R. 8174, 72d Cong. (1933). As noted in the Commissioner General's report, the
agency supported the advancement of the registry date. See REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER
GENERAL OF IMMIGRATION 36-37 (1932).
86 See H.R. 8174. The bill was passed by the Senate, but because the version differed from
the one that had been passed by the House and could not be reconciled and voted on again, it
failed to become law. See 76 CONG. REC. 5522-24 (1933).
" See S. 3769, 73d Cong. (1934); H.R. 9760, 73d Cong. (1934). This ten-year period
would have allowed anyone to qualify for permanent residency who had been in the United
States for the prescribed period, could establish good moral character, and did not fit within
the exclusions. See H.R. REP. No. 73-1827 (1934).
88 During the 74th Congress in 1936, legislation was introduced which would have both
provided for suspension of deportation for persons in an illegal status for ten continuous years
and also would have changed the registry cutoff date from July 3, 1921 to July 1, 1924. See S.
2969, 74th Cong. §§ 3, 5 (1936).
89S. 3361, 87th Cong. § 4 (1962); H.R. 11,911, 87th Cong. § 4 (1962).
9 The amendments created the two-tiered suspension of deportation language of seven
and ten years of residency depending on the basis for a person's deportability. The statute
provided that where a person was deportable for past crimes she would be required to show a
higher degree of hardship (extremely exceptional and unusual) and ten years of continuous
physical presence. On the other hand, if the person had no disqualifying criminal behavior, she
would be required to show a lesser degree of hardship (extreme hardship) and seven years of
continuous physical presence. See Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, § 4, 76 Stat.
1247, 1247-48 (repealed 1996).
" See H.R. 8713, 94th Cong. § 4 (1975); COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., AMEND-
ING THE IMMIGRATION AND NATIONALITY ACT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, H.R. REP. No. 94-
506, 16-17 (Comm. Print 1975).
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B. Historical Origins of Suspension/Cancellation Relief
Until 1940, U.S. immigration laws included provisions allowing a per-
son to escape deportation, even if only on a temporary basis.92 For example,
section 3 of the Immigration Act of 1917 gave the Secretary of Labor au-
thority to allow the admission of unaccompanied children under the age of
sixteen. 93 Another section authorized the discretionary readmission of per-
sons who were returning to their unrelinquished domicile of at least seven
consecutive years.
94
With the exception of registry, it was not until 1940 that the immigra-
tion laws were amended to include a provision that allowed persons who
were otherwise illegally in the country to receive protection in the form of
permanent residency. To be granted permanent residency, the Alien Regis-
tration Act of 1940 required that a person establish good moral character for
the preceding five years and show that her deportation would result in seri-
ous economic detriment to a spouse, parent, or minor child, who was either a
permanent resident or U.S. citizen.95 Under the 1940 Act, a person's deporta-
tion would be "suspended" for six months, at which time a report would be
made to Congress.96 The person would then be granted permanent residency
unless a joint resolution was issued by both houses of Congress objecting to
the permanent suspension of the person's deportation.97 Thus, absent Con-
gressional action, a decision granting suspension of deportation would result
in permanent residency. 9
Congress enacted these provisions in 1940 after hearing accounts of the
hardships faced by the family members of persons subject to the rigid depor-
92 The Act of June 25, 1798 authorized the President to order the detention and deportation
of "all such aliens as he shall judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States,"
and it simultaneously gave the President the power to allow such persons to remain in the
country, effectively suspending or staying their deportation. Act of June 25, 1798, ch. 58, § 1,
1 Stat. 570, 571. A later statute enacted in 1903 allowed the Commissioner General of Immi-
gration to suspend the deportation of persons not in compliance with the contract labor provi-
sions. Act of Mar. 3, 1903, ch. 1012, § 19, 32 Stat. 1213, 1218. The Act of February 20, 1907
allowed the temporary suspension of deportation for persons whose testimony was needed in
enforcing the provisions of the Act governing the detention and deportation of inadmissible
persons. See Act of Feb. 20, 1907, ch. 1134, § 19, 34 Stat. 898, 904; In re Aliens, 231 F. 335,
337-39 (N.D.N.Y. 1916).
93 Act of Feb. 5, 1917, ch. 29, § 3, 39 Stat. 874, 876. The Act allowed for the suspension
of deportation where the person was needed to assist in the prosecution of immigration viola-
tors. Id. § 18, 39 Stat. at 888.
94 See id. § 3, 39 Stat. at 878.
9' See Alien Registration Act of 1940, ch. 439, § 20, 54 Stat. 670, 672 (amending Act of
Feb. 5, 1917, § 19, 39 Star. at 889). The Alien Registration Act was primarily designed to deal
with preventing the admission of persons suspected of engaging in subversive activities. See
86 CONG. REc. 7818 (1940) ("The Committee of the Judiciary is very anxious to secure action
on this measure, because it [will] assure the public that Congress is doing something about the
so-called 'fifth column' and in correcting subversive activities.").
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tation statutes of the time.99 The clear effect of these deportations was the
separation of families, which often meant that a family's sole wage earner
would be removed from the country. °° In 1948, the law was amended fur-
ther to permit suspension of deportation for those immigrants who could
demonstrate the requisite hardship, but who did not have family ties with
U.S. citizens or permanent residents.101
However, with the exception of amendments enacted in 1986, each
amendment of the immigration laws since the 1948 statute has curtailed sus-
pension relief.102 Amendments enacted in 1996 imposed further restrictions
and renamed the benefit "cancellation of removal."'0 3 Since its original es-
tablishment in 1940, Congress has progressively curtailed access to this ben-
efit by increasing the level of hardship, complicating the procedure for
qualifying, and most recently, requiring that the hardship not be on the appli-
cant, but rather on her U.S. citizen family member instead.'
°4
In addition to the good moral character basis for suspension of deporta-
tion, the 1948 amendments required a person to show continuous residence
in the United States for seven years at the time that the application was
submitted. 05 The amendments modified Congress's role in the process by
requiring both the House and Senate to pass favorable resolutions before the
suspension would be effective. 0 6 Following the 1948 amendments, two ave-
nues for suspension relief were created: one for those who could demon-
" See GORDON ET AL., supra note 13, § 74.07(2)(a) & n.4.
'00 Many of the earlier cases for this relief involved seamen who were married to U.S.
citizens, traveled frequently, and did not have legal status in the United States. The economic
hardship to a person's family was the standard for justifying a grant of lawful status in the form
of suspension of deportation. See S. Rap. No. 81-1515, at 595-96 (1950).
1o1 See Act of July 1, 1948, ch. 783, 62 Stat. 1206; S. REP. No. 81-1515, at 596.
02 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(2) (1994), repealed by Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C,
§ 308(b)(7), 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). The amendments enacted in 1986 were primarily focused
on correcting the results of the Supreme Court's interpretation of the statute, which found that
any absence for whatever period, irrespective of the reason, created a break in a person's
continuous residence for purposes of qualifying for suspension of deportation. See Immigra-
tion & Naturalization Serv. v. Phinpathya, 464 U.S. 183 (1984); H.R. REP. No. 99-682(I), at
78 (1986) as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5682.
103 In part, the re-characterization of the benefit to "cancellation of removal" served the
purpose of conformance with the language of the 1996 statute, which replaced the term "de-
portation" with "removal." See AEDPA, Pub. L. 104-132, § 401, 110 Stat. 1214, 1258-68
(codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. §§ 1531-37 (2006)). The 1996 amendments also increased
the level of requisite hardship, and required an applicant to show that "removal" would result
in extremely exceptional and unusual hardship to his citizen or permanent resident spouse or
children. See IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, div. C, sec. 304, § 240A(b)(7)(D), 110 Stat.
3009, 3009-594 (1996) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(D) (2006)). The previ-
ous version had required only extreme hardship on the alien or his U.S. citizen or permanent
resident spouse and children. See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1994) (repealed 1996).
"4Indeed, much of the critique leveled at suspension of deportation in the post-1962
period was related to its illusory nature. See Comment, Suspension of Deportation: Illusory
Relief, 14 SAN DioO L. REv. 229 (1976).
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strate five years of good moral character and economic hardship, and the
second for those able to prove seven years of continuous residency.
10 7
Four years later, with the enactment of the century's most comprehen-
sive immigration reform, Congress further modified the suspension relief
through the McCarran-Walter Act. 08 The 1952 revisions were based on the
belief that there had been a widespread pattern of abuse in suspension claims
and that the relief needed to be curtailed. °9 The result was that suspension of
deportation was modified to require a showing of good moral character, con-
tinuous residency, and that the person's deportation would result in excep-
tional and extremely unusual hardship to the applicant or her immediate
family members." 0 The statute broke down suspension applicants into five
different classes based on the grounds of deportability that would be sus-
pended, with different residency requirements for each."' Depending on the
basis for deportability, the suspension claim could either require a positive
resolution or inaction in both houses of Congress." 2 While Congress accom-
plished its objective of severely limiting suspension relief, the numbers of
private bills increased substantially." 3 In the end, Congress, in its effort to
limit the suspension relief, created a very confusing set of laws.
114
Later amendments to suspension relief occurred in 1962 and 1996. In
the 1962 amendments, Congress significantly simplified suspension of de-
portation relief,"5 which, as noted, had become complicated by the 1952
07 See id.
108 Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
The process began in 1947, culminating in an extensive report issued in 1950 titled "The
Immigration and Naturalization Systems of the United States." S. REP. No. 81-1515 (1950).
"°gSee S. REP. No. 81-1515, at 556, 595-603.
lOMcCarran-Walter Act § 244, 66 Stat. at 214-16.
Id.
12 Id. at 216. For example, if the basis for deportability was X, a positive resolution was
required, whereas if the basis was Y, then relief would only be precluded by the introduction
of a negative resolution.
"' See Comment, Suspension of Deportation-A Look at the Benevolent Aspect of the
McCarran-Walter Act, 61 MICH. L. REV. 352, 369 (1962). Private bills are those introduced by
members of Congress to grant special dispensation, often in the form of permanent residency,
something not otherwise available under the statute. While few conclusions can be drawn
about private bills without conducting an exhaustive exploration of each bill, commentators
agree that private immigration legislation is representative of some of the compelling humani-
tarian cases that individual members of Congress receive from their constituents. See GAL-
LAGHER, supra note 21, at 7; SANA LouE, IMMIGRATION LAW AND HEALTH § 8.1 (2009); Kati
Griffith, Perfecting Public Immigration Legislation: Private Immigration Bills and Deportable
Lawful Permanent Residents, 18 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 273-80 (2004). According to records kept
by the Department of Homeland Security, the number of introduced private bills began in-
creasing dramatically in the 80th Congress (1947-48) and reached its peak in the 85th Con-
gress (1957-58), around the same time as when Congress moved the registry date to 1940. See
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2003 YEARBOOK OF IM-
MIGRATION STATISTICS 182 tbl.51 (2004). Statistics on the introduction and enactment of pri-
vate bills are not available before the 77th Congress (1941-42).
"
4 See GORDON, supra note 13, § 74.07[2][b]; PRESIENr's COM'N ON IMMIGRATION
AND NATURALIZATION, WHOM WE SHALL WELCOME 211 (1953).
"' See Act of Oct. 24, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-885, § 4, 76 Stat. 1247, 1247-49 (repealed
1996).
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enactment of the McCarran-Walter Act. The 1962 changes retained the legis-
lative veto and reduced the classes of suspension from five to two."16 The
amendments enacted in 1996 brought about another shift from earlier laws
and were part of a larger reformulation of the immigration laws.",' With the
1996 amendments, Congress created one unified "removal" procedure in
place of the exclusion/deportation proceedings found in the earlier immigra-
tion laws."'
With the enactment of the 1996 amendments, what had previously been
known as "suspension of deportation" became known as "cancellation of
removal." 1 9 Since the amendments were not retroactive, the narrower 1996
prerequisites for cancellation were not imposed on those who had already
met the requirements of the previous suspension of deportation. 20 The stat-
ute created two broad categories of cancellation: one for permanent re-
sidents,'2 ' acting as a waiver on grounds of inadmissibility and deportability,
and one similar to the earlier suspension of deportation, but only available to
those who are not permanent residents.'22 The 1996 amendments also placed
116 Id. at 1247-48. Suspension applicants who were deportable based on most grounds
found in the statute were required to show: (1) extreme hardship to either themselves or their
immediate family members who were permanent residents or U.S. citizens; (2) good moral
character; and (3) seven years of continuous residency. Id. Those deportable for certain crimes
were expected to show extremely exceptional and unusual hardship and good moral character
for ten years following the act constituting the criminal basis for deportability. Id. at 1248. The
legislative veto provisions would later be found unconstitutional in Immigration & Naturaliza-
tion Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 959 (1983). According to some commentators, the only
effective legislative veto would be one that was enacted through the normal legislative process,
meaning passage by both chambers of Congress and presentation to the President for approval
or veto. See RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, 2 TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW-SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 10.8(b) (4th ed. 2007).
"' See IIRAIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified as amended in
scattered titles of U.S.C.).
118 Id.
.. Id. at div. C, sec. 304, § 240A, 110 Stat. at 3009-594 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b (2006)).
2' The passage of the 1996 amendments provided the impetus for additional relief from
the changes made to suspension/cancellation relief. In 1997, Congress passed legislation that
extended the less onerous hardship standards, which had existed prior to the 1996 amend-
ments, to certain nationals of Nicaragua, Cuba, El Salvador, and Guatemala, nationals of for-
mer Soviet bloc countries, and their dependents. See Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central
American Relief Act ("NACARA"), Pub. L. No. 105-100, tit. II, § 203, 111 Stat. 2160, 2196
(1997) (codified as amended in 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)). Those who were
eligible to apply would only need to show extreme hardship to themselves or their U.S. citizen
or permanent resident family members as opposed to extremely exceptional and unusual hard-
ship to their U.S. citizen or permanent resident family members.
121 IIRAIRA, div. C, sec. 304, § 240A(a), 110 Stat. at 3009-594 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C § 1229b(a) (2008)). It replaced what was previously known as "212(c)" relief.
122 Id. § 240A(b) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C § 1229b(b)). The special form of can-
cellation relief that is available to battered spouses, parents, or children of U.S. citizens or
permanent residents under § 1229b(b)(2) is not included in this discussion. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(2). This form of cancellation is more generous than the previous suspension of
deportation as it is available to persons who were never married, but intended to marry, a
lawful permanent resident or citizen and were subject to extreme cruelty. Id.
§ 1229b(b)(2)(A)(i)(III). Normally, under immigration law, the non-citizen beneficiary must
have a petitioning spouse, parent, or family member. This form of cancellation eliminates the
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the first numerical cap on the number of suspension applicants who could be
adjusted to permanent residency in any given year.'23 Further, the amend-
ments required ten years of continuous residency and hardship of an excep-
tional and extremely unusual nature to the applicant's immediate family. 12 4
Prior to the 1996 amendments, under suspension of deportation, a per-
son's absences which were "brief, casual, and innocent and did not meaning-
fully interrupt" her physical presence would not have led to disqualification
from relief.'25 However, under the current cancellation of removal system, an
absence is treated as a break in the person's residence if she has been out of
the country for more than ninety days on an individual trip or in excess of
180 days in the aggregate. 2 6 The newly created cancellation, unlike the pre-
vious suspension of deportation, is also available to persons in removal pro-
ceedings where they are seeking admission.'27 The 1996 amendments
retained the good moral character requirements and extended the require-
ments to the ten-year period immediately preceding the filing of the applica-
tion. 2 s Finally, under the 1996 amendments, broad categories of people are
ineligible for cancellation of removal, including persons who were admitted
as crewmen subsequent to June 30, 1964, certain exchange visitors, persons
inadmissible or deportable on security grounds, and those immigrants previ-
ously granted cancellation relief.12 9
While the available data on suspension of deportation are difficult to
evaluate due to variations in reporting and changes in the procedure for ap-
proval, the period from 1940 to 1947 appears to have been the most
favorable for the applicant. 130 In these years, an average of nearly 3000 ap-
plications were granted per year.'3 ' In only one year between 1948 and 1986
did the number of approvals reach close to the average of the first seven
petition requirement by the abuser. See 8 C.F.R. § 204.2(c)(4) (2008) (allowing self-petition
by spouse of abusive citizen or lawful permanent resident).
123 IIRAIRA, div. C, sec. 304, § 240A(e), 110 Stat. at 3009-596 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C § 1229b(e)(l)). No more than 4000 applicants could be adjusted under the statute. Id.
124 See id. § 240A(b)(l), 110 Stat. at 3009-594 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b(b)(l)). Under previous versions of suspension of deportation, a person could base her
claim on hardship to herself in addition to the hardship on his or her family members. See 8
U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1990) (repealed 1996).
125 8 U.S.C. § 1254(b)(2).
126 IIRAIRA, div. C, sec. 304, § 240A(d)(2), 110 Stat. at 3009-595 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C § 1229b(d)(2) (2006)).




1291d. § 240A(c), 110 Stat. at 3009-595 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(c)
(2006)).
30 According to the agency's annual reports during the period from 1940 to 1947, 20,444
cases were submitted for approval to Congress. However, it is not clear how many cases were
rejected. See IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEFI OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL RE-
PORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (1947). As noted previously, until
1948, a person would receive permanent residency unless a negative resolution was introduced
in both houses of Congress.
131 Id.
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years of the suspension statute.'32 Otherwise, the highest number of approv-
als was 1088 in 1956, and in many years it was barely over 100 persons.'33
In the five-year period immediately preceding the enactment of the amnesty
of 1986, a total of 835 people were granted relief. 34
IV. THE AMNESTY OF 1986
There were many reasons for enacting an amnesty in 1986. First, the
grant of an amnesty would provide political cover for the employer sanctions
that were to be imposed as part of the immigration legislation. 135 Second, the
millions of undocumented persons who were in the country at the time could
not have been removed without a major strain on the immigration enforce-
ment system.136 Third, many of these people had built substantial ties within
their communities and were contributing to them in a valuable way.
In enacting the 1986 reforms, Congress effectively created two differ-
ent amnesty programs: one for agricultural workers, and the other for un-
"' In the fiscal year ending on June 30, 1952, 7300 cases had been submitted and 2899
were approved. See IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'r OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 30 (1952).
'33 For example, in 1963 and 1964, the number of approvals was 20 and 15, respectively,
and in 1970, 1975, and 1980 it was, respectively, 199, 121, and 17. See IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1980 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF THE IMMI-
GRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 7-10 tbl.4; IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV.,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE
1975 34; IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 1970 38; 1965 IMMIGRATION REPORT, supra
note 54, at 25.
114 IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., U.S. DEPr OF JUSTICE, 1985 STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 12 (1986). The suspension of
deportation cases for 1986 was not incorporated because the 1986 amnesty, with its primary
prerequisite of unauthorized status for four years preceding its enactment, provided suspension
applicants with a more viable form of relief.
"' Indeed, a refrain that would be repeated in the Hesburgh Commission was that the
amnesty, together with sanctions, would effectively close the "back-door" of immigration by
taking away the incentive to migrate to work in the United States. See SELECT COMM'N ON
IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST,
THE FINAL REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SELECT COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION
AND REFUGEE POLICY TO THE CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 3 (1981),
available at http://www.eric.ed.govAERICWebPortal/contentdelivery/servletlERICServlet?
accno=ed211612. The Commission indicated that "[t]he recommended legalization program
will help to enforce the law, however, only if other enforcement measures designed to curtail
future illegal migration to the United States are instituted." Id. at 14. Thus, "[r]ecognizing
that future migration pressures could lead to even higher levels of illegal migration to the
United States, [they] emphasized the development of effective enforcement strategies, includ-
ing a new law to penalize employers who hire undocumented/illegal aliens and new measures
to control the abuse of non-immigrant status." Id.
136 The Hesburgh Commission considered a variety of programs to solve the problem of a
large undocumented alien population, including massive deportation and legalization, and con-
cluded that "[a]ttempts at massive deportation would be destructive of U.S. liberties, costly,
likely to be challenged in the courts and, in the end, ineffective." Id. at 72-73. Indeed, the only
massive deportation effort in U.S. history occurred in the mid-1950s with tremendous mone-
tary and personnel costs and civil liberty violations of those expelled or repatriated by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service. Id. at 73.
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documented persons who were not connected to the agricultural industry.3 7
The major difference between these two programs was that the agricultural
worker provisions had fewer and less rigid requirements. For example, while
non-agricultural workers were required to show unlawful status prior to Jan-
uary 1, 1982,138 the "agricultural workers" needed to show only that they
had worked for at least ninety days during the period between May 1, 1985
and May 1, 1986.139 Agricultural workers could apply for amnesty up to
eighteen months after the period beginning seven months following the stat-
ute's enactment, 4° while the non-agricultural workers were required to file
for amnesty within twelve months beginning not later than six months fol-
lowing the enactment date.
14
The differences between the two amnesty schemes can only be justified
as part of the political compromise needed to secure the bill's passage, given
the important agricultural interests in Congress. 42 There was great concern
that increased border enforcement and sanctions against employers who
would later hire unauthorized workers would create difficulties for these em-
ployers in securing the workers needed to harvest crops and perform other
functions on the farms each season. 143 The compromise included additional
137 See IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, secs. 201, 302, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended at
8 U.S.C. §§ 1160(a), 1255a(a) (2006)) (section 1160(a) is entitled "Special Agricultural
Workers").
t38 Id. at sec. 201, § 245A(a)(2)(A), 100 Stat. at 3394 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(a)(2)(A)).
139 Id. at sec. 302(a), § 210(a)(1)(B), 100 Stat. at 3417 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1160(a)(1)(B)). While not essential to this discussion, there were two groups of agricultural
workers under the statute: one that was called "group I" and consisted of the first 350,000
qualifying applicants, and "group 2," which was the remainder of those qualifying for am-
nesty. Id. § 210(a)(2), 100 Stat. at 3417-18 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1160(a)(2)).
Group I members were first accorded temporary residence and, one year later, received per-
manent residency, while group 2 members received temporary residency, but had their adjust-
ments to permanent residency delayed until one year after the end of the application period. Id.
4'Id. at sec. 302, § 210(a)(l)(A), 100 Stat. at 3417 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1160(a)(1)(A)).
'4' Id. at sec. 201, § 245(a)(l)(A), 100 Stat. at 3494 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(a)(l)(A)).
142 See, e.g., 131 CoNo. REC. 23,579 (1985) (Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) noted, "[t]his
country cannot afford to attempt immigration reform, while ignoring the vital interests of small
farmers who produce our agricultural necessities," and Sen. Alan Simpson (R-Wyo.) stated
that "I could not agree with my colleagues more that agriculture, especially perishable com-
modities, has some very special needs .... [M]any of the things that we depend on in this
country [are] in agriculture").
""' See, e.g., id. at 23,576 (Sen. Pete Wilson (R-Cal.) stated that the "purpose of [the]
amendment is to provide a seasonal agricultural worker program for employment in perishable
commodities, the objective of which is consistent with those desired by the supporters of this
immigration reform legislation"). In addition to providing the amnesty programs, the statute
for the first time included provisions that imposed civil fines and possible criminal penalties on
employers who knowingly hired unauthorized workers. See IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sec.
101, 100 Stat. 3359, 3360-74 (1986) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)-(f) (2006)).
The statute further imposed a requirement that all employers conduct at least a cursory docu-
ment verification or check of persons whom they hire within three days of employment. Id. at
sec. 101, § 274A(b), 100 Stat. at 3361-63 (codified as amended at § 1324a(b)).
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"sweeteners," such as restrictions on farm searches,' 44 and other provisions
designed to facilitate the admission of temporary foreign agricultural work-
ers in future years.' 41 The inclusion of the anti-discrimination amendments
secured additional support for the bill's passage.146 These amendments were
designed to allay concerns that employer sanctions would cause discrimina-
tion against persons whom employers might believe were unauthorized
workers. 141
The non-agricultural amnesty program required that the applicant show
that he had been in the United States before January 1, 1982 and that she had
resided continuously in an unlawful status from January 1, 1982 until the
application was filed.148 The provision also precluded amnesty: (1) where the
person had been convicted of any felony or three or more misdemeanors
committed in the United States; (2) where she had participated in the perse-
cution of others; or (3) where she was inadmissible because of a narcotics
conviction or due to political or security grounds.149 Under the regulations
promulgated pursuant to the statute, brief, casual, and innocent trips would
not be treated as breaks in a person's residence, unless an individual trip
exceeded forty-five days or the trips totaled more than 180 days after Janu-
ary 1, 1982.10 Similarly, pre-authorized emergency trips, or those with a
humanitarian purpose would not be regarded as breaks in residence.' 5 '
Under the new program, the applicant for amnesty was in the peculiar
position of proving illegal status or simple entry, because a legal entry would
disqualify the person from eligibility for the benefit. For example, a person
who entered the country legally might be able to argue that she was in the
United States illegally either because she had remained longer than author-
ized or because of a failure to file regular address report changes with the
'"See IRCA, sec. 116, § 287(d), 100 Stat. 3359, 3384 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1357(e) (2006)).
141 See id. at sec. 301, 100 Stat. at 3411-17 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1101(a)(15)(H)(ii)(a) (2006)) which provides for the temporary admission of agricultural
workers as defined by the Secretary of Labor. This program is commonly known as the H-2A
program. See ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW, supra note 14, at 115-16.
" IRCA, sec. 201, § 245A, 100 Stat. 3359 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(j)
(repealed 1996)).
141 See, e.g., 132 CONG. REc. 30,905 (1986). The bill's requirement that employers verify
all workers was intended in part to avoid possible discrimination.
148 See IRCA, sec. 201, § 245A(a)(2)(A), 100 Stat. at 3359 (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A) (2006)).
'See id. at sec. 201, § 245A(a)(4), 100 Stat. at 3395 (1986) (codified as amended at 8
U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(4) (2006)). Excepted from this are convictions for possession of less than
thirty grams of marijuana. Id. § 245A(d)(2)(B)(ii)(III), 100 Stat. at 3399 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(d)(2)(B)(ii)(II) (2006)).
50 Id. § 245A(a)(3), 100 Stat. at 3395 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)
(2006)). The standard for determining whether the break actually interrupted the person's con-
tinuous residency requires a showing that the absence was not brief or casual. Id.
§ 245A(g)(2)(A), 100 Stat. at 3400 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(g)(2)(A)
(2006)).
'' 8 C.F.R. § 245a.2(i) (2008).
20101
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government, but this person would not be eligible for amnesty. 5 ' A person
who entered the country on a tourist visa, worked in the United States, ob-
tained a social security card, and filed tax returns-acts that were treated as
making the unlawful status known to the government-would be similarly
ineligible for the benefit." 3 Thus, the exercise of establishing illegal status
could be successful even if the person was only able to establish technical
violations of her status.
There has, and continues to be, litigation in cases involving this am-
nesty program. 154 The requirement that an applicant establish continuous
residency caused many people returning from brief overseas trips during the
amnesty period to be rejected when they originally sought amnesty because
the INS required that government employees or representatives of agencies
that were authorized to receive amnesty applications reject applications con-
taining such a break in residency.'55 Other cases involved persons who were
illegally in the United States before January 1, 1982 and re-entered with
fraudulent visas. 15 6 A number of these cases are still pending, and final adju-
dication on the legalization applications is ongoing as part of the settlement
reached between the government and the parties in the case."'
V. REGISTRY, SUSPENSION, AND CANCELLATION AS
AMNESTY SURROGATES
The underlying purpose of any amnesty is to grant the beneficiary a
form of permanent or durable legal status in the United States. The legal
mechanisms, or immigration relief, that have been used to accord this status
are registry, suspension of deportation (cancellation of removal), and private
legislation. As noted, private legislation is an extraordinary remedy when all
152 See In re H-, 20 I. & N. Dec. 693, 696 (B.I.A. 1993) (presenting a situation where
applicant had failed to comply with the address notification and regular reporting requirement
under 8 U.S.C. § 1305 (1976) for non-immigrants), rev'd on other grounds, Immigrant Assis-
tance Project v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 306 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2002).
'13 In re P-, 19 I. & N. Dec. 823, 826, 829 (B.I.A. 1988). One way that a person could
qualify for temporary resident status was where the person fell out of status and that fact
became "known to the government." 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(d) (2006).
154 See, e.g., Immigrant Assistance Project of the L.A. City. Fed. of Labor (AFL-CIO) v.
Ashcroft, 306 F.3d 842 (9th Cir. 2002); Catholic Soc. Servs. v. Immigration & Naturalization
Serv., 232 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc), remanded to Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v.
Ashcroft, 206 F.R.D. 654 (E.D. Cal. 2002); Catholic Soc. Servs. v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1149
(E.D. Cal. 1988), affid sub nom. Catholic Soc. Servs. v. Thornburgh, 956 F.2d 914 (9th Cir.
1992), vacated sub nom. Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs., 509 U.S. 43 (1993), remanded sub nom.
Lopez v. Mukasey, 241 Fed. Appx. 958 (4th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 447 (2008).
'.. See Catholic Soc. Servs., 232 F.3d at 1142-43; Catholic Soc. Servs., 685 F. Supp. 1149
(E.D. Cal. 1988).
'
56 1n re P-, 19 I. & N. Dec. 823, 827-28 (B.I.A. 1988).
157 The settlement allowed the applicants to re-submit their legalization claims. The cases
would be re-adjudicated, with the applicant's right to appeal preserved. See Courts Approve
Settlement Agreements in LULAC/Newman, CSS; Filing Instructions Expected at End of
March, 81 INTERPRETER RELEASES 275, 275-77 (2004).
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other forms are unsuccessful. 5 All of these remedies are designed to ame-
liorate the severe hardships that restrictive immigration laws can impose
upon an applicant's family and community. While each of these forms of
relief may not require proof of each of the elements described here, each
does contemplate that the undocumented person has spent some extended
period of time living in and becoming a part of the community, and that to
force her removal would be seen as an unnecessary hardship.
Registry and suspension relief have provided mechanisms for dealing
with the dilemma of having provisions in the law that require the deportation
of persons, while simultaneously giving the adjudicator discretion to amelio-
rate the hardships of separating the applicant from her well-established roots
in the community. Without these discretionary devices, the government
would ultimately be required to take large numbers of undocumented per-
sons and place them into the removal process, which would burden the sys-
tem with time and resource consuming adjudications. Certainly, at least
some people believe that deporting much of the undocumented population is
the appropriate solution.'59 However, forcing the immigrants' departure is
contrary to the principles of family unity and humanitarianism, which have
long been important elements of our immigration policy. The longer that a
person lives and works in the community, the more difficult and wrenching
her separation will be. While those hardships will fall heaviest on families
that are comprised of U.S. citizens and permanent residents, separation will
also cause hardships to others including businesses, churches, and other so-
cial groups within the community. Indeed, because of the legal obstacles
created in 1996, unless significant amendments are made to the immigration
laws as part of a broad-based amnesty program, forced deportations will
cause the permanent separation of immigrants from their communities and
families.
While registry is similar to amnesty, it differs from the 1986 amnesty in
several ways. Unlike registry, which accords permanent residency on its
beneficiaries, the 1986 amnesty granted temporary status to applicants.
60
This temporary status did not enable the beneficiary to confer derivative or
any other status on immediate family members. 16' One year after receiving
temporary residence, the amnesty recipient could apply for permanent resi-
158 See GALLAGHER, supra note 21, at 12.
151 See Immigration Reform Dead, ARiZ. REP., June 29, 2007, at A. 1; Carolyn Lochhead,
House GOP Doing it their Own Way on Immigration, S.F. CHRON., Jun. 21, 2006, at A.5.
'
6o See IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sec. 201, § 245A(a), 100 Stat. 3359, 3394-95 (1986)
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a) (2006)).
161 Normally in immigration law, there is a primary beneficiary (the main applicant) and
derivative beneficiaries (the applicant's immediate family). For example, many nonimmigrant
visas allow accompanying immediate family members to acquire the same visa classification.
See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(15)(F)(ii) (2006) (student visas); § 1l01(a)(15)(G)(i) (2006)
(government officials); § 1 101(a)(15)(H)(iii) (2006) (temporary work visas). Immigrant visas
are issued in a similar fashion. See ESSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW, supra note 14, at 98.
While this has been the practice in most areas of immigration law, Congress did not follow this
approach was not followed when it created the amnesty in 1986. IRCA, sec. 201, § 245A(a).
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dent status. 6 Only after receiving this status could he petition for family
members and begin to accrue status in order to apply for citizenship.t 63
This status restriction created serious problems for those who qualified
for the 1986 amnesty, as their family members remained unprotected. It
would not be until many years later that those family members would be
able to obtain legal status. 64 In some cases, family members were placed
into complicated immigration quandaries resulting in even more burdens on
the immigration system. Indeed, as mentioned previously, a number of those
who were unable to obtain amnesty have remained in the country only to
seek other immigration relief.
The following scenario illustrates a few of the problems that resulted as
a consequence of the limits placed on 1986 amnesty recipients. Imagine that
an undocumented person, A, has been in the United States illegally since
before the amnesty cutoff date of January 1, 1982, but her spouse and imme-
diate family members enter the United States illegally on a later date. Even
if A could qualify for amnesty, her family members will remain "illegal" for
years beyond the time that A qualifies for the amnesty. Oftentimes, A's fam-
ily members will be required to leave the United States and return to their
native country, because the amnesty legislation requires that each individual
family member be able to separately qualify for relief. If a family member is
discovered before obtaining legal status, she remains subject to the deporta-
tion process.
A person may petition for her spouse and unmarried children only if
she is either a lawful permanent resident or a U.S. citizen.16 While the pro-
cess for a citizen petitioning for a spouse or child is significantly faster than
when the petitioner is a permanent resident, it remains quite lengthy.'
66
Under the amnesty program, an application to confer status on behalf of a
family member can be filed only after the primary beneficiary secures status,
not when legalization is granted.'67 More importantly, the immigrant quota
restrictions prevent the immediate family member from receiving status until
162 See IRCA, sec. 201, § 245A(b), 100 Stat. at 3395-97 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(b) (2006)).
163 The general qualifying period for naturalization (citizenship) is five years unless the
person acquired his permanent residency based on marriage to a U.S. citizen or has served
honorably in the military under a declared hostility. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1427(a)(1), 1430(a)
(2006).
"6 A person without permanent legal status may not petition for family members until his
status becomes permanent, at which time he remains subject to the immigrant quota. See Es-
SENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW, supra note 14, at 129, 133.
161 d. at 133.
66 Id. at 135-36. When a citizen is petitioning for her immediate family member, she
proceeds outside of the immigration quota. If she entered with a visa, she may be able to
obtain status without leaving the country through a process called "adjustment of status." See
8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) (2006). The immediate family is defined as the spouse and minor children
or, in the case of an adult petitioner, and it can include the parents of the U.S. citizen where the
child is 21 or older. See id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
1
67 See 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006 & Supp. 1 2008).
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the quota restrictions have been satisfied. 6 ' Other restrictions in 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255 preclude a person from obtaining permanent residency until after she
departs the United States and proceeds to an overseas U.S. Consulate to
receive an immigrant visa. 69 These hardships that were visited upon the
other non-qualifying family members resulted in Congress's 1990 enactment
of the family unification provisions, which effectively provided a reprieve
from deportation. 70
The most recent failed attempt to enact amnesty legislation involved a
statutory scheme that met only a few of the principles outlined in this Arti-
cle.'7 ' The version of amnesty that was passed by the Senate divided the
potential beneficiaries into two broad categories: agricultural and non-agri-
cultural workers. The proposal would have allowed an undocumented
worker to obtain status after she had shown that she had been physically
present in the United States before April 5, 2001 in an illegal status, had
shown that she did not qualify under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a), 72 unless she could
qualify for a waiver of the inadmissibility ground, and had paid a fine.'73 The
person would also have to show that she had been employed for at least
three years during the five-year period from April 5, 2001 to April 5,
168 Annual limitations on the spouses and unmarried children of lawful permanent re-
sidents are restricted to approximately 114,000 immigrants per year. Id. § 1153(a)(2) (2006).
169 The statute specifically prevents the adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident
status where the person seeking the status has entered the United States without a visa or has
worked without authorization, unless the petitioner is an immediate relative to a primary appli-
cant. See id. § 1255(c) (2006).
170 See IMMACT 90, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 301, 104 Stat. 4978, 5029-30 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a (2006 & Supp. II 2008)); 136 CONG. REc. 27,072 (1990). Under
the Family Unity Act, the spouse and unmarried children received an automatic stay of re-
moval. IMMACT 90 § 111, 104 Stat. at 4986. The family relationship must have been estab-
lished by May 5, 1988 if the applicant applied under the non-agricultural amnesty, and
December 1, 1988 if she applied under the provision for agricultural workers. See 8 C.F.R.
§ 236.12(a)(2) (2007). The person would lose the benefits of family unity if, as the son or
daughter, he or she was married, or if the spouse divorced the primary amnesty beneficiary. Id.
§ 236.18. But see Hernandez v. Reno, 91 F.3d 776, 780-81 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that, to
receive status under family unity, the children of the legalized alien must be unmarried as of
May 5, 1988 but need not remain unmarried after that date to continue to receive status).
Congress, acknowledging that "[t]he wait for family reunification can be long and painful,"
included the Family Unity provisions in IRCA to help unite families. 136 CONG. Rac. 27,072
(statement of Rep. David Bonior (D-Mich.)). It recognized that it is not only "antifamily to
allow such long separations [but] also counterproductive [as] it encourages illegal immigra-
tion as the best way to become united with loved ones." Id. Thus, its purpose was "to allow
husbands and wives, and parents, and children to remain together [and] keep [the govem-
ment] from wasting valuable enforcement resources on deporting children and spouses who
will ultimately be allowed to enter the country anyway." 136 CONG. REc. 27,081 (statement of
Rep. Bruce Morrison (D-Conn.)).
..' The proposed legislation was part of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of
2006 and included a title described as the Immigrant Accountability Act of 2006. S. 2611,
109th Cong. (2006).
172 Section 1182(a) disallows immigrants from receiving visas based on, among other
things, health-related grounds, criminal grounds, security-related grounds, and foreign policy
grounds. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a) (2006, Supp. I 2007, Supp. II 2008).
1
73 S. 2611 § 601(b).
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2006.174 However, the employment requirement was modified depending on
the person's physical or mental condition or educational level. 17 In addition,
the person was required to show that she had certain basic "citizenship
skills" relating to English proficiency and knowledge of U.S. history and
government. 17
6
A similar bill was introduced in the House of Representatives, but it
included a different cutoff date of June 1, 2006,1'" and required a shorter
employment period.' 78 Under the House's version, the applicant could satisfy
the citizenship skill requirement by pursuing a course of study. 179 According
to the Senate bill, an agricultural worker could qualify for status if she had
worked for an established number of hours in the two-year period ending on
December 31, 2005.180 The House version had the same employment re-
quirement, but it covered the two-year period ending December 31, 2006.81
Neither version included a citizenship skills requirement for agricultural
workers. 182
By some accounts, the number of undocumented persons in the United
States approaches eleven million.'83 Any amnesty program will significantly
tax the resources of whichever government agency is called upon to admin-
ister it. Every requirement that the applicant must meet under the amnesty
definition enacted will require her to present proof. Similarly, the govern-
ment official adjudicating the claim will need to verify the bona fides of the
individual claim. The more requirements for qualification, the greater the
burden that will fall on the government officers called upon to review the
documents. Likewise, the longer that a person has been in the country, the
more potential points of inquiry the government has to pursue. Furthermore,
as the amnesty definition is narrowed by more and more requirements, the
burden on amnesty applicants will also grow.
One of the problems of the 1986 amnesty was its requirement that each
applicant establish not just that she had been in the United States prior to the




177 Security Through Regularized Immigration and a Vibrant Economy (STRIVE) Act of
2007, H.R. 1645, 110th Cong. § 601(b) (2007). The statute would have created a "conditional
nonimmigrant" classification allowing those granted this status to apply for status as lawful
permanent residents. Id. § 602.
178 Id. § 601(e)(1)(A).
"' Id. § 407 (amending 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (2006 & Supp. II 2008)).
180 S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 613(a)(1)(A) (2006).
"'1 H.R. 1645 § 643(a)(1).
182 S. 2611 § 613; H.R. 1645 § 601(b).
"3 The estimates of the undocumented vary widely, but according to one well-known
demographer, the number of undocumented in 2005 was nearly eleven million. JEFFREY S.
PASSEL, PEw HISPANIC CTR., ESTIMATES OF THE SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNDOCU-
MENTED POPULATION 1 (2005), available at http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/44.pdf.
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ously.1'4 The statute also required that the applicant be able to document that
she had been physically present after the date of the amnesty's enactment." 5
Applicants thus had to provide extensive documentation to establish unlaw-
ful status, residency, and physical presence. 186 These requirements were bur-
densome on both the applicants and the agency. Consider the extensive
documentation necessary to establish continuous residence or illegal status
since December 31, 1981, and physical presence between the enactment and
end of the amnesty application period." 7 An applicant could demonstrate her
illegal status through the difficult task of establishing an illegal entry or by
remaining in the country after her authorization had expired. Proving resi-
dency and physical presence would also be a great challenge to an applicant
who has been trying to remain invisible for the applicable amnesty period.
Likewise, once an applicant demonstrated residency, disproving a person's
claim of residence would be a great burden upon the agency, unless a person
had been deported or had left through some other verifiable means.
One consequence of these seemingly simple requirements was that each
applicant had to submit a voluminous set of documentation in order to sat-
isfy the statute. In order to adjudicate claims, immigration officers reviewing
the claim would have to interview the applicant and examine the documenta-
tion, which would constitute a time-consuming exercise. Amnesty applicants
whose claims were denied might later be placed in removal proceedings
where they could raise a host of defenses, which, depending on the facts,
could include asylum, adjustment of status, or suspension of deportation,
among others. 8 These claims raised in the deportation hearing'89 would then
'4 IRCA, Pub. L. No. 99-603, sec. 201, § 245A(a)(2)(A), 100 Stat. 3359, 3394 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1255a(a)(2)(A) (2006)); 8 C.F.R. § 245a.1(c)(1)(i) (2008).
18 IRCA § 245A(a)(3)(A), 100 Stat. at 3395 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(a)(3)(A) (2006)).
186 Id. § 245A(g)(2)(D), 100 Stat. at 3401 (codified as amended at § 1255a(g)(2)(D)
(2006)).
" The statute required a showing of illegal status before January 1, 1982. Id.
§ 245A(a)(2)(A). Further, by regulations, absences that exceeded thirty days and were not
preauthorized during the amnesty period were deemed to be sufficient to make the person
ineligible. 8 C.F.R. § 245a.l(g) (2008). The agency, in error, assumed that any unauthorized
absence during the amnesty period precluded eligibility, and it was only following a class
action suit that these applicants were able to have their cases reconsidered. See Catholic Soc.
Servs. v. Meese, 685 F. Supp. 1149 (E.D. Cal. 1988), affid sub nom. Catholic Soc. Servs. v.
Thornburgh, 956 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1992), vacated sub. nom. Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs.,
509 U.S. 43 (1993), remanded to sub nom. Catholic Soc. Servs. v. INS, 232 F.3d 1139 (9th
Cir. 2000) (en banc), remanded to sub nom. Catholic Soc. Servs., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 206 F.R.D.
654 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
"I8 Under the 1986 amnesty, a person who had her application denied was not automati-
cally placed in removal proceedings, as the statute assured applicants of confidentiality. See
IRCA, secs. 201, 302, §§ 245A(c)(5), 210(b)(6), 100 Stat. at 3397-98, 3419-20 (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1160(b)(6), 1255a(c)(5) (2006)). The purpose of the provision was to
encourage as many applicants as possible to come forward without the risk of being deported.
Indeed, Congress indicated that "[t]he confidentiality of the records is meant to assure appli-
cants that the legalization process is serious, and not a ruse to invite undocumented aliens to
come forward only to be snared by the INS." H.R. REP. No. 99-682(1) (1986), as reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5677.
2010]
Harvard Journal on Legislation
be presented in an adversarial proceeding before an immigration judge, with
further appeals to the Board of Immigration Appeals and the federal appel-
late courts. 90 Up until the passage of legislation in 1996, if an applicant
could establish that her deportation would cause "extreme hardship" either
to the applicant or her spouse, parent, or child who was a U.S. citizen or
permanent resident, she could seek suspension of deportation. 91 Such claims
might require extensive proof, and most applicants would not be able to
qualify. These claims would, however, cause extended delays as a result of
the time required to present the applications before immigration judges, the
ensuing administrative appeals, and federal court review.
VI. A PROPOSAL FOR REFORM
Similar to the rising concerns that gave way to the amnesty of 1986,
today's call for a new amnesty is an explicit recognition that the existing
enforcement regime has not worked. Amnesty is a pragmatic solution, de-
signed to relieve some of the pressures placed on the system. At the same
time, it is an opportunity to retool the enforcement effort, and concentrate
not on past, but on future violators, at least in those cases where the past
violator does not present a threat to the safety and security of society at
large.
While constructing the solution, it is important to remember that the
overall objective of immigration laws of the United States is to keep the flow
of people into the country to a manageable level, while preserving the inter-
ests of family unity and the need for labor. The laws establish a group of
persons who may not enter the country or whom, if found within the borders,
are to be ejected. These laws characteristically attempt to provide discretion-
ary relief from deportation where certain hardships are established. Within
this framework, when the immigration controls fail to be effective, a govern-
ment has the choice either to engage in a serious crackdown or to create
some sort of amnesty program by instituting a series of restrictive measures
coupled with incentives. Many countries, particularly those that receive
larger numbers of persons, either use registry or suspension of deportation to
deal with the population of persons without legal status or create some form
of amnesty. 1
92
189 The term "deportation" is used here, for it was not until 1996 that Congress established
the term "removal" for the proceeding to eject a person or prevent her admission. See AEDPA,
Pub. L. No. 104-132, sec. 401, §§ 501-07, 110 Stat. 1214, 1258-68 (1996).
"90 See IRCA, sec. 201, § 245A(f)(4), 100 Stat. at 3400 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C.
§ 1255a(f)(4) (2006)).
See 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (repealed 1996).
192 For example, Spain, which had a population of over 40 million people in 2009, enacted
an amnesty in 2004, which adjusted the status of nearly 600,000 people. See Real Decreto
2393/2004 de 30 de diciembre, por el que se aprueba el Reglamento de la Ley Orginica 4/
2000, de I I de enero, sobre derechos y libertades de los extranjeros en Espafia y su integraci6n
social, B.O.E. 2005, 323 Nov. 3, 2005, available at http://noticias.juridicas.com/basedatos/
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One fact that should be clearer after this exploration of registry and
suspension relief is that these means have long-standing historical precedent.
Indeed, if Congress is poised to create an amnesty, it should amend the ex-
isting registry statute or borrow liberally from the language of registry and
cancellation to craft a program that is simple, straightforward, and has few
conditions. To meet the objectives previously identified, Congress should,
much like the registry of 1929, create a registry date that is within a period
from five to seven years immediately preceding the enactment date of
whatever statute is passed by Congress and signed into law by the President.
While all of the objectives of an amnesty will not be met by the advance-
ment of the registry date, many of the amnesty objectives can be met by a
more generous registry date. The use of a five- to seven-year benchmark is
admittedly an arbitrary one, but it comes from the realization that the further
out the date, the fewer people who might qualify. Five to seven years is a
period found in many provisions of the immigration laws where ties to the
community and hardships are in question. 193 If the legislature follows the
existing standards for registry, under a new amnesty the applicant would still
be required to establish good moral character at the time that the application
is made and for some reasonable period of time prior to the application
rather than throughout the period of residency. 94 The person would have to
Admin/rd2393-2004.html#au; CIA, The World Factbook-Spain, https://www.cia.gov/library/
publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sp.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2009). This was not Spain's
first attempt to enact an amnesty; it also created one in 1985, 1991, 1996, 2000, and 2001. See
Marfa Pab6n L6pez, Immigration Law Spanish-Style: A Study of Spain's Normalizaci6n of
Undocumented Workers, 21 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 571, 575-77 (2007). According to population
estimates available for Spain, as of June 30, 2009 it had 4.6 million persons with foreign
registry certificates or valid residence cards. See Secretaria de Estado de Inmigracion y
Emigracion, Estadisticas, http://extranjeros.mtin.es/es/InformacionEstadistica/ (last visited
Oct. 27, 2009).
'93 For example, one part of the current cancellation of removal provision allows persons
who have been permanent residents for five years and have lived in the United States for at
least seven years to take advantage of the waiver. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (2006). Suspension
of deportation was set at seven years and was later divided into two separate residency formu-
las, one that required seven years residency and the other ten years. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1254(a)(1)(2) (repealed 1996). Similar standards apply to waivers of grounds of inadmissi-
bility and deportability. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h) (2006) (family ties with U.S. citizen or
permanent resident and extreme hardship and rehabilitation); § 1227(a)(l)(H) (2006) (family
ties with U.S. citizen or lawful permanent residents and favorable discretionary factors). The
Board of Immigration Appeals has adopted a flexible standard for the exercise of discretion in
these cases that includes, among other things, family ties with U.S. citizens or permanent
residents, hardship, circumstances surrounding the bad act, and evidence of good moral char-
acter. See In re Tijam, 22 I. & N. Dec. 408, 412 (B.I.A. 1998).
'9' See In re Sanchez-Linn, 20 I. & N. Dec. 362 (B.I.A. 1991). This conforms to the idea
that a person who may have past transgressions should not be precluded if he is able to show
that he has learned from his past. The notion that a person might be required to show rehabili-
tation following a criminal conviction has long been a part of the exercise of discretion in
determining whether a waiver of inadmissibility and deportability might be granted to long-
term residents facing possible removal. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § l182(h)(1)(A)(iii) (relief under
waiver of inadmissibility for past crimes); Matter of Marin, 16 I. & N. Dec. 581, 587-88
(B.I.A. 1978) (rehabilitation as factor in relief under former 8 U.S.C. § 1182(c)); Palacio-
Torres v. INS, 995 F.2d 96, 99-100 (7th Cir. 1993). The immigration relief was commonly
referred to as "212(c) relief." See EsSENTIALS OF IMMIGRATION LAW, supra note 14, at 75-76.
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establish that she is not deportable or inadmissible for national security rea-
sons, such as being a terrorist or a Nazi. The only automatic or per se dis-
qualifying criminal grounds for denying registration would be those
involving serious crimes, particularly those involving violence or trafficking
in drugs, or where the applicant is unable to show rehabilitation. However, a
person should be able to establish rehabilitation if the fact finder is con-
vinced that there is little likelihood that she will engage in criminal behavior.
The fact finder would have to consider whether the person's later behavior
shows that she has reformed or whether the reasons that caused the person to
commit the crime in the first place no longer exist.
The amnesty should also not have too many complicating requirements,
as each would reduce the possible persons who will qualify. In the 1929
registry, where the clear objective was to encourage as many as possible to
apply, numerous immigrants were disqualified due to the difficulties of es-
tablishing continuous residency in the period following the cutoff date, while
others were discouraged by the filing fee. 195 This highlights the concern that
each qualification creates its own evidentiary challenge and further burdens
the adjudicatory process. The longer the qualifying period, the more docu-
mentation that will be required to establish a case, thereby further burdening
the agency. Thus, advancing the registry date even closer in time to the stat-
ute's enactment would be prudent and advisable, in order to avoid leaving a
large portion of the undocumented population outside of the amnesty pro-
gram's reach.
As previously discussed, to be effective, any amnesty should have the
goal of encouraging as many qualified applicants as possible to apply. How-
ever, merely encouraging applicants to apply is not enough to deliver a suc-
cessful amnesty. In the end, the agency charged with administering the
program and managing the newly tooled immigration system must be able to
handle an amnesty program designed around this objective. This means that
great care should be taken not to overburden the amnesty program with ad-
ministrative hurdles and to assure that those responsible for adjudicating the
claims can do so efficiently. If the agency is unable to handle a significantly
increased workload, these problems would likely spill over into increased
pressures on the enforcement side. Therefore, the simpler and more stream-
lined the amnesty program, the lesser the burden that will be placed on the
overall immigration system.
One critique of this proposal might be that the registry of 1929 did not
encompass as large of a population of eligible immigrants as exists at the
In 1996, the relief was incorporated and modified into cancellation of removal-one for long-
term permanent residents and the other for non-permanent residents. Id. at 75.
195 Information regarding the program is rather scant, but according to the Commissioner
General's report of 1932, in that year the agency issued 14,144 certificates and denied six
percent based on the inability to satisfy the requirements. 1932 IMMIGRATION REPORT, supra
note 48, at 36.
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present time, and, therefore, it is not an appropriate model.196 While it is true
that the registry enacted in 1929 did not provide legal status to as large of a
group as could qualify here, the reason for using registry is that its use has
strong historical roots in our immigration tradition and is far less cumber-
some than an amnesty. Furthermore, one of the political arguments used
against the 1986 amnesty that clouds the present debate is that amnesty cre-
ates a bad historical precedent and encourages illegal immigration. 197 Yet,
registry, suspension, and cancellation are all ameliorative tools designed to
relieve a burdened immigration system and effectively deal with a large un-
documented population. The core of this debate is whether amnesty is the
cause of illegal migration or one of a number of tools for dealing with the
problem.
For the most part, this Article's proposal and its justification present a
pragmatic argument and deliberately avoid the debate about the merits of
comprehensive immigration reform. The contours of whatever amnesty is
finally enacted will determine the success or failure of legal immigration
reform. If the amnesty program fails to meet the objective of bringing the
large undocumented population out from the shadows, enforcement efforts
will overwhelm the immigration system, and comprehensive reform will fail.
VII. CONCLUSION
As presently written into the immigration statute, neither registry, sus-
pension of deportation, nor cancellation relief is a true amnesty, for an am-
nesty contemplates the wholesale regularization of a large population. When
enacted, these immigration benefits had the potential to be used as a way of
dealing with compelling humanitarian immigration cases. However, the
many changes that Congress has made to these remedies have limited their
availability to only a small portion of the undocumented population. While
generous, the measures of the past were complicated remedies that left large
numbers of undocumented persons outside of their coverage. These immi-
gration remedies were seen as ameliorative devices to deal with the hard-
196 The types of immigration restrictions that created the large undocumented population
that we have today had only just been put into effect twelve years before the first registry was
enacted. See Registry Act of 1929, ch. 536, § l(a)(1), 45 Stat. 1512, 1513; Immigration Act of
1917, ch. 29, 39 Stat. 874 (repealed 1952).
"I Throughout the debate on comprehensive immigration reform opponents argued that
amnesty would reward illegal behavior and act as a magnet for further illegal immigration.
Indeed, President George W. Bush, careful to avoid being seen as supporting an amnesty
stated:
Now, this isn't an amnesty program. Let me be clear about this. This is a temporary-
worker program to be registered and above-board. I oppose amnesty because am-
nesty-amnesty would encourage further illegal immigration. And I oppose amnesty
because amnesty would reward those who have broken the laws of the United States.
President's Remarks to the United States Conference of Mayors, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. 123 (Jan. 26, 2004).
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ships that would be inflicted on citizens and residents who formed part of the
communities and families of the person who was without status or otherwise
deportable. Granting these benefits was not a pure act of charity, for these
remedies allowed the immigration authorities to focus their limited enforce-
ment resources on those who truly deserved the amnesty. Therefore, a less
complicated and broader immigration benefit would be to use registry and
cancellation as originally envisioned when first enacted. Using a remedy
grounded in the existing immigration statute provides the added benefit of
familiarity for the agency responsible for its implementation. In the end, the
success of the amnesty program will depend on the meritorious cases of
hardship that it resolves. If its coverage is too narrow, renewed calls for
reform will soon arise.
In 1975, the late Charles Gordon, the immigration scholar and former
general counsel to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, argued for
far-reaching changes to the immigration laws.'98 Gordon noted that the re-
moval of discretion to ameliorate the terrible hardships that resulted from
deportation-the wrenching and tearing apart of families was one of the
most serious problems that existed in immigration laws. The moral critique
leveled by Gordon carries more force today, for the problems faced by pol-
icy makers in 1975 pale in comparison to what we are witnessing today. 199 In
an era when border and national security loom large as issues requiring at-
tention, the need to bring the undocumented population from out of the
shadows requires serious attention from our political leaders. This Article
tackles a small but significant part of the reform puzzle.
Charles Gordon, The Need to Modernize our Immigration Laws, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REv.
1 (1975). Among other things, Gordon argued for the advancement of the registry date. Id. at
25.
1 9 While getting a clear picture of the number of undocumented persons in the United
States may be an elusive task, we may still be able to draw comparisons between the numbers
of 1986 and the present. The estimates of numbers of undocumented in the period preceding
the 1986 program ranged from 2 to 4 million persons. See NAT'L ACAD. OF SCI., IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS: A STORY OF NEGLECT 87-88 (1985). Estimates of the number in the current period
range widely. In 2003, the number was 5 to 5.8 million. Press Release, Immigration & Nation-
alization Serv., INS Releases Updated Estimates of U.S. Undocumented Resident Population
(Jan. 31, 2003). In 2008, the number was said to be 11.6 million. MICHAEL HOEFER ET AL.,
OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHO-
RIZED IMMIGRANT POPULATION RESIING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2008 (2009).
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